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NOTES
TO SUE OR NOT TO SUE:
VIDEO-SHARING WEB SITES, COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT, AND THE INEVITABILITY
OF CORPORATE CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout 2006, a remarkable phenomenon invaded the digital world;
a phenomenon that could be attributed to the combination of easy access to
technology,1 a new generation full of deteriorating attention spans, and to
some commentators, the entertainment industry’s “shockingly slow”
responses to consumer behavior.2 This phenomenon was the development
and successful proliferation of social networking and video-sharing Web
sites. These sites, which include Yahoo! Video,3 Google Video,4 Revver,5
VMIX,6 YouTube,7 and MySpace,8—to name a few—allow users to sign
up, upload videos, store them, rate them, distribute them, or embed them in
other Web site pages.9 While a number of uploaded videos are created by
amateurs attempting to attain fame and, perhaps, some fortune, several
thousands more are copied from television or stolen from other Web sites
and subsequently uploaded by someone other than the actual copyright
owner.10

1. See Mark G. Tratos, Entertainment on the Internet: The Evolution of Entertainment,
Production, Distribution, Ownership and Control in the Digital Age, in ENTERTAINMENT LAW
331, 335 (Howard Siegel ed., 3d ed. 2004) (“[D]igital technology has made copying and high
quality reproduction available in every area of entertainment to almost anyone, not just those with
once rare and expensive reproduction equipment.”).
2. Barrie McKenna, Entertainment Media Bite Digital Hand that Could Feed Them, GLOBE
AND MAIL, Sept. 26, 2006, at B17.
3. Yahoo! Video, http://video.search.yahoo.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
4. Google Video, http://video.google.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
5. Revver, http://www.revver.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). However, unlike most video
sharing sites, Revver shares advertising revenue with every user who uploads or shares the video.
See Revver, http://one.revver.com/go/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). Revver also screens all
submitted videos to prohibit copyright infringement. See Revver Copyright Policy,
http://one.revver.com/go/copyright (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
6. VMIX, http://www.vmix.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
7. YouTube—Broadcast Yourself, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
8. MySpace Video, http://vids.myspace.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
9. More technologically savvy users are even able to download the videos.
10. See, e.g., Anthony S. Volpe, YouTube, Viral Videos and Copyright Infringement on the
Internet, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 6, 2006. (“You make a visit to Youtube [sic] and find
copyrightable works, such as newscasts, music videos, sports highlights, movie clips and even
entire television shows posted.”).
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Accordingly, some of these Web sites have actively engaged in policing
their sites to make sure copyrighted videos do not appear.11 Others,
however, including two of the most popular sites, YouTube12 and
MySpace,13 thus far have hidden behind the veil created by the enactment of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “safe harbor” provision;14 arguing
that as long as all of the DMCA requirements are met, the service provider
is not liable for money damages.15 Many commentators do agree that the
DMCA protects sites like YouTube and MySpace.16 While this strategy has
enabled sites to avoid legal action for the time-being, however, over the past
several months, copyright owners, who maintain the exclusive right to
reproduce their work, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform and/or
display publicly their work,17 are increasingly, and finally, beginning to take
notice; and their discontent has become progressively apparent.18
Using YouTube as the model,19 this note will explore the various ways
in which the entertainment industry and independent creators have reacted
11. Max Kalehoff, Can Social Video Honor Copyright And Compensate the Artist?,
Sept.
8,
2006,
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
MEDIAPOST,
Articles.showArticle&art_aid=47853 (interview with Revver’s co-founder and Senior VP who
stated that “‘humans watch over the network’” and screen the videos to prevent copyright
infringement).
12. While writing this note, on Oct. 9, 2006, Google bought YouTube for $1.65 billion,
leading some to believe that YouTube will now be able to concentrate more on protecting against
copyright infringement. See Paul R. La Monica, Google to Buy YouTube for $1.65 Billion: Search
Engine Leader Looks to Bulk Up in the Burgeoning Online Video Market, CNNMONEY, Oct. 9,
2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/googleyoutube_deal/?postversion=2006100917.
YouTube will continue operating as an “independent unit of Google,” id., but it remains to be seen
whether YouTube will take further steps to prevent against infringement or whether more lawsuits
will be filed because of Google’s “deep pockets.” See, e.g., Catherine Holahan, YouTube’s New
Deep Pockets: The online video star has found a rich parent, but can it ensure that it won’t leave
Google vulnerable to copyright lawsuits?, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2006/tc20061010_083340.htm; see also
Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 11,
2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116049721244288215.html.
13. According to Alexa Web Information Service, YouTube is ranked 4th and MySpace is
ranked 6th among all Web sites tracked, see Alexa, http://www.alexa.com (last visited Oct. 11,
2007), compared to Revver, see Revver, supra note 5, which is ranked 4,332nd. Alexa Traffic
Rankings, http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?url=http%3A%2F%2F (last visited
Oct. 11, 2007).
14. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 § 201, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) [hereinafter
DMCA]. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
16. See, e.g., Heather Svokos, ‘You Gotta Check This Out’; The Passion to Share Video Clips
has Made a Web Site an Overnight Sensation, BERGEN RECORD, Apr. 15, 2006, at F1 (“Wendy
Seltzer, a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School . . . [said
that] [a]s long as YouTube follows the notice and takedown rules, it’s immune from liability.”).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
18. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
19. I chose YouTube because each video-sharing site operates in slightly different ways, and
YouTube is leading the way in the web television market. It boasts approximately 100 million
videos on the site, with 65,000 videos added every day. It has also become a press target, drawing
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to this latest phenomenon. It will examine whether video-sharing sites will
follow in the path of the peer-to-peer networks such as Napster,20 and will
also attempt to provide a framework leading to a solution to the existing
tensions among copyright law, corporate control, and the digital age.
Part II will describe how Congress has dealt with the enormous task of
adapting copyright law in a futile attempt to keep up with technological
development, describing the legislative enactments, developments, and
changes in copyright law, beginning with the U.S. Constitution and ending
with the adoption of the DMCA. Part III will examine the most recent cases
involving Internet and peer-to-peer file sharing,21 engaging in an analysis of
direct and indirect infringement and how it pertains to video-sharing Web
sites and illustrating how copyright owners may have the law on their side.
Part IV will discuss the entertainment industry’s recent reactions to the
explosion of video-sharing and social-networking Web sites. Part V will
provide an analysis of the reasons why it is more beneficial for copyright
owners to work with, instead of against, video-sharing Web sites. This Part
argues that although copyright owners may be successful in court, the
stigma that will attach to their efforts, the financial burden it will impose,
and the loss of a beneficial promotional tool, are detrimental to the industry.
Finally, this Part will also propose a method by which the entertainment
industry and the Web sites can work together to appeal to public demand
while permitting copyright owners to maintain control over, and reap the
benefits from, the content that appears on the sites.

over 3,000 articles per week. Scott Woolley, Video Fixation, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006, at 100.
Although this Forbes article, for example, is complimentary, several others have focused on the
site’s blatant copyright infringement. See, e.g., Volpe, supra note 10. Others have concentrated on
the debate pertaining to whether the site is the next Napster and whether it is liable for copyright
infringement. See, e.g., Michael Geist, Why YouTube Won’t Become Napster Redux, TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 16, 2006, at C3; Brad Stone, Is YouTube the Napster of Video?, NEWSWEEK ONLINE,
Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11617588/site/newsweek/page/2/; Reply All, Does
YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116069721244288215.html (containing a conversation between
John Palfrey, Harvard Law Professor, and Stan Liebowitz, University of Texas at Dallas
Economics Professor).
20. See, e.g., John Boudreau, How Will YouTube Make Money? Ad Strategy Key to Turning
Millions of Clicks into Cash, MERCURY NEWS, July 12, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR
11981946 (“YouTube’s work-in-progress business plan has raised concerns among some industry
observers who believe the Web site could go the way of Napster. The former Redwood City filesharing company became an Internet star by allowing people to exchange copyrighted music, but
became less popular as a legal site.”).
21. See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete? Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios,
Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 862–68 (2004), for background
information about peer-to-peer technology; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining how peer-to-peer file sharing works).
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW: A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
A. THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND AMENDMENTS PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE DMCA
By recognizing the value of artistic expression and creativity, the U.S.
Constitution provided the framework for copyright law. Article I, § 8 gives
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 The first American
Copyright Law was adopted in 1790, and gave authors and proprietors the
“sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending”
books, charts and maps for a term of fourteen years. 23 It also stipulated the
requirements for registering a copyright in the county clerk’s office.24 In
1831, musical compositions, designs, etchings and engravings were added
to the list of protected works;25 the first U.S. copyright case appeared in the
Supreme Court in 1834.26 In 1865, photographs were added to the list of
copyrightable works,27 conveniently corresponding with the publishing and
selling of Matthew Brady’s Civil War photos.28 Musical compositions were
later added in 1909;29 moving pictures were added in 1911 “[t]hrough the
request of industry,” and sound recordings were added in 1971.30
While Congress continued to amend copyright laws, extending them to
adapt to new technology, businesses in the entertainment industry began
requiring that artists and creators convey their copyrights to the company
representing them.31 The 1909 Act:
[F]urthered the industries’ interests by expressly allowing corporations,
partnerships and other business entities to be deemed the “authors/owners”
of creative works as the concept of works made for hire was added to
copyright law. As a result, the majority of all entertainment-related
copyrights filed in the United States after . . . 1909 . . . were filed on
behalf of business entities, not individuals.32

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (amended 1831).
Id. at § 3.
Copyright Act of 1831 § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831) (amended 1865).
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 658 (1834) (“That every man is entitled to the fruits of his
own labour must be admitted.”).
27. Copyright Act of 1865 § 2, 13 Stat. 540 (1865).
28. See Jon M. Garon, Entertainment Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 559, 592 (2002).
29. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909).
30. Tratos, supra note 1, at 340.
31. Id. at 342.
32. Id.
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To combat industry takeover of individual works, however, Congress
later adopted § 203 of the 1976 Act,33 to allow artists to reclaim the works
“[b]etween the 35th and 40th year of the copyright term.”34 Furthermore, the
1976 Act provided that protection exists “in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed,” and included literary, musical, dramatic, pantomime and
choreographic, pictorial, graphic and sculptural, motion pictures and other
audiovisual work, sound recordings and architectural works.35 Finally,
“digital forms of artistic works were protected through the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in
1998.”36
Other amendments included the adoption of § 408 in 1988, which
altered the formal nature of copyright laws, and provided that registration of
copyright is no longer a condition of protection, meaning that as soon as
words hit the page, they are protected.37 Later, the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act,38 adopted in 1998, extended the copyright term to the
author’s life plus 70 years for individuals and 95 years from publication, or
120 years from creation for businesses.39
B. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT’S SAFE HARBOR
PROVISION: WHY VIDEO-SHARING WEB SITES ARE FAR FROM
SAFE
As technology continued to advance, and copyright owners continued
to demand protection, Congress adopted the DMCA in order to cope with
the difficulties caused by the digital age.40 The Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act, which is Title II of the DMCA, was
enacted to “provide certainty for copyright owners and Internet service
providers with respect to copyright infringement liability online,”41 and to
“protect the property rights of Americans in their work as they move in the
global, digital marketplace, and, by doing so, continue to encourage the
creation of new works to inspire and delight us and to improve the quality
33. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the
exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a
copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to
termination.”).
34. Tratos, supra note 1, at 342.
35. Copyright Act of 1976, § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
36. Tratos, supra note 1, at 341.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). However, “[r]egistration still remains desirable . . . because it
provides proof that a valid copyright exists. Further, registration is required to bring an
infringement action under the federal statute.” INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE INTERNET 10
(Lewis C. Lee & J. Scott Davidson eds., 1997).
38. 17 U.S.C § 302 (2006).
39. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 916 (2003) (holding that the statute was constitutional).
40. See generally, S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
41. Id. at 1.
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of our lives.”42 This section limits liability for monetary damages when
service providers are either passive conduits43 or merely store or host
material at the direction of users.44 Moreover, this limitation “is an
affirmative defense, as to which the defendant bears the burden of proof,”45
and is employed only after a court finds the service provider liable for
copyright infringement.
Video-sharing sites began to appear on the Internet only within the last
few years;46 and thus far, the safe harbor protection, as it pertains to these
sites, has not been tested in court. Most video-sharing Web site providers
argue that they are protected by this “safe harbor” provision, and that as
long as they comply with all of the DMCA requirements, they are not liable
for monetary damages.47 However, in similar cases involving Web sites or
peer-to-peer networks, some courts have essentially ignored the provisions
once contributory liability has been found.48 Furthermore, when copyright
owners alleged direct infringement, courts have interpreted the DMCA’s
protection “to be a floor, not a ceiling, of protection,”49 meaning that
DMCA analysis is just one step in the process of determining liability.50
Therefore, in addition to designating an agent to receive complaints51 and
adopting, implementing, and informing users of a policy to terminate repeat
infringers,52 the service provider must also meet several requirements
before finding refuge under the DMCA. Three of these requirements are
described below.
1. The “Service Provider” Requirement
First, to be protected, the sites need to qualify under the DMCA’s
definition of “service provider.”53 Thus far, courts have not been asked to
42.
43.
44.
45.

S. REP. NO. 105-144, at 11889 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
6-41 (2006).
46. For example, YouTube was founded on February 14, 2005. See YouTube Founders,
http://www.youtube.com/t/founders (last visited Dec. 16, 2006). “MySpace . . . launched in 2003.”
Alex L. Goldfayn, Time Flies When You’re Having Fun with Technology, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Sept. 18, 2006, at 7.
47. See, e.g., Leslie Simmons, YouTube: News Service Infringement Claim ‘Without Merit’,
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER,
ESQ.,
July
19,
2006,
THE
http://www.hollywoodreporteresq.com/thresq/litigation/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=10028
41475.
48. See, e.g., In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
49. CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004).
50. Id.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2006).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
53. The Copyright Act broadly defines the term “service provider” to include:
[A]n entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
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determine whether video-sharing Web sites fall under the DMCA’s
definition,54 and if courts decide that such sites are not “service providers,”
the sites will then be precluded from claiming DMCA protection. However,
since the language contained in § 512(k)(1)(B) is broad, “[a] fortiori it
covers such Web presences as . . . online file sharing services.”55
Furthermore, district courts have interpreted the DMCA definition to
include similar types of Web sites.56 Therefore, because courts will likely
find that the sites are service providers, the sites qualify for DMCA
protection as long as they satisfy the other numerous requirements.
Moreover, since they store material at their users’ direction, they fall under
§ 512(c).57
2. The “Knowledge” Requirement
Section 512(c) limits service providers’ liability if infringing material is
posted by users and stored on the server as long as the service provider does
not have “actual knowledge that the material . . . is infringing.”58 In
addition, if the service provider does not have actual knowledge, it must
also be unaware “of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.”59 If the service provider subsequently becomes aware of facts or
circumstances, or obtains actual knowledge, it must “act expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material.”60 Once a copyright owner
user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received.
. . . The term “service provider” means a provider of online services or network access,
or the operator of facilities therefor . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1).
54. Robert Tur, see infra note 168 and accompanying text, alleges that the video-sharing sites
are not “service providers.” See Steve Bryant, Examining Google’s Inheritance: Robert Tur v.
EWEEK,
Oct.
23,
2006,
YouTube,
GOOGLEWATCH:
http://googlewatch.eweek.com/content/archive/examining_googles_inheritance_robert_tur_v_you
tube.html#comments, for Robert Tur’s response to Bryant’s article, in which he states, “[c]learly
[YouTube is] not [an OSP]. Youtube [sic] is first and foremost, a commercial website engaged in
willful distribution of millions of infringing copyrighted works for a profit.”
55. See DRATLER, supra note 45, at 6-44.4.
56. See Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). After quoting part
of § 512(k)(1)(B), the court did not engage in an analysis of whether the eBay auction Web site
fell under the DMCA’s definition of “service provider.” The court stated that eBay’s site, on
which “sellers . . . post ‘listings’” that describe and display photographs of items for sale, which
allows buyers to find items to bid on or buy, qualifies as a “‘service provider’ within the meaning
of Section 512.” Id. at 1084, 1088. See also CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet. Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
552 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that a Web site, which allows users or subscribers to upload and post
commercial real estate listings, is an ISP that, if protected by the DMCA, would fall under §
512(c)(1)).
57. Section 512(c) “applies where a plaintiff seeks to hold an Internet service provider
responsible for . . . (1) infringing ‘material’ stored and displayed on the service provider’s
website.” Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
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provides notice of infringement that substantially meets § 512(c)(3)
requirements,61 the service provider is then considered to have the requisite
knowledge and is, therefore, compelled to act.62
Aside from receiving proper notice, however, the statute does not
clarify when or in what other ways service providers may acquire the
requisite knowledge.63 Most commentators claim that actual knowledge is
acquired only after the service provider receives notice of infringement, and
therefore, as long as they remove the infringing material upon receiving
notice, they are covered.64 However, once courts have found service
providers liable for contributory infringement,65 which includes a
requirement of actual or constructive knowledge,66 they have, in effect,
disregarded any further protection that may or may not have been intended
by the statute’s enactment.67
To find actual or constructive knowledge, courts have a copious amount
of evidence available, especially where the more popular sites are

61. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)–(B), for notification requirements. See 17 U.S.C.
§512(g)(1)–(4), for removal requirements and effects, as well as counter-notification
requirements. Courts have broadly interpreted notice requirements in order to lessen the burden to
copyright holders when multiple infringements are alleged. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Cmtys.,
Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[N]otification requirements are relaxed to the extent that,
with respect to multiple works, not all must be identified—only a “representative list. . . . [W]ith
respect to location information, the copyright holder must provide information that is ‘reasonably
sufficient’ to permit the service provider to ‘locate’ this material.”).
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); see also Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082,
1089 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Under the third prong of the test, the service provider’s duty to act is
triggered . . . upon receipt of proper notice.”).
63. However, the Copyright Act does indicate that if a copyright owner does not substantially
comply with the notification set forth in § 512(c)(3)(A), then the court shall not consider the
notification as providing the actual knowledge or awareness of the facts or circumstances of
infringing activity. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i). But see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
In a case in which the notification . . . fails to comply substantially with all the
provisions of subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and
(iv) . . ., clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the service provider promptly
attempts to contact the person making the notification or takes other reasonable steps to
assist in the receipt of notification that substantially complies with all the provisions of
subparagraph (A).
Id.

64. See Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s Balancing Act: Making Money, Not Enemies,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, ESQ., July 10, 2006, http://www.hollywoodreporteresq.com
/thresq/spotlight/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002802746 (explaining why YouTube may
be shielded by the DMCA).
65. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
66. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (defining contributory infringement); see also discussion infra Part III.B.1.
67. See A & M Records, Inc v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(after finding that Napster was liable for contributory infringement, the court refused to engage in
an analysis of the DMCA provisions, stating that just because the DMCA “explicitly excludes”
service providers that have actual knowledge from protection, it does not “[shelter] contributory
infringers”).
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concerned. The mainstream media and various internet bloggers68 have
devoted much energy to drawing the public’s attention to several infringing
videos, making it almost impossible for service providers to avoid the
commentary.69 Furthermore, YouTube consistently acknowledges its
awareness of the fact that infringement occurs on the site, and has made
futile attempts to limit the infringement.70 Although YouTube will claim
that it was unaware of specific infringing videos before being notified of the
infringement, and therefore, did not have the requisite knowledge under the
DMCA,71 since it is obviously aware of several infringing videos and
activities, it is not a stretch for courts to determine that YouTube was aware
of the rampant infringement. Moreover, other internet sites, such as
Australia’s Peekvid.com,72—while it does not host any copyrighted videos
directly—create indexes of several copyrighted videos already posted on
YouTube and Google, and subsequently sort the infringing videos into
categories from which users can choose to view. Its affiliated site,
KeepVid.com,73 then provides a tool that enables users to download the
videos they were able to locate on Peekvid.74 The availability of these sites
draws further attention to the blatant and vast copyright infringement

68. See Patrick Goldstein, The People’s Republic of YouTube, L.A. TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 17,
2006, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/cl-et-goldstein17oct17,0,171750,print.story?
coll=la-home-entertainment; see also Mark Cuban, GooTube—The End of DRM?, BLOG
MAVERICK, THE MARK CUBAN WEBLOG, http://www.blogmaverick.com/2006/10/11/gootubethe-end-of-drm/; Svokos, supra note 16.
69. See Woolley, supra note 19, at 100 (“YouTube began showing up in quick mentions in the
media, luring still more visitors. . . . Months later that would explode to 3,000 articles per week
and hundreds of stories on television.”).
70. See Your 15 Minutes of Fame..ummm…Make that 10 Minutes or Less, YOUTUBE BLOG,
Mar. 26, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/blog?entry=oorjVv_HDVs (“We poked around the
system a bit and found that these longer videos were more likely to be copyrighted videos from tv
[sic] shows and movies than shorter videos posted.”). While this is a nice gesture, it also provides
evidence of knowledge, and even may permit courts to infer that YouTube, while not specifically
encouraging copyright infringement, is not exactly discouraging it either. It is simply limiting the
duration of the copyrighted clip. Therefore, if users wanted to post numerous ten-minute clips,
they could potentially post entire episodes.
71. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent
any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot
be liable for contributory infringement.”).
72. Peekvid: Watch Videos Online, http://peekvid.com/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). In fact,
this site allows you to watch entire movies. See The Notebook on Peekvid,
http://movies.peekvid.com/s3253/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (splitting the movie into 12
different parts all gathered from YouTube).
73. KeepVid: Download videos from Google, YouTube, iFilm, Putfile, Metacafe,
DailyMotion!, http://keepvid.com/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
74. See Louisa Hearn, Video Piracy’s New Battleground, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June
26,
2006,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/video-piracys-new-battleground/2006/06/23/
1150845364940.html (“And now that indexes such as Peekvid are building businesses around the
cataloguing [sic] of content appearing on video sites—including music, sporting clips and even
entire television programs—pirated content is expected to become even more accessible to the
casual browser.”).
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occurring on YouTube and likely provides enough awareness of the
infringing activity.
Even if a service provider, upon acquiring knowledge, expeditiously
removes infringing material, there are other ways for courts to conclude that
the DMCA does not protect the service provider. For example, if the service
provider has not implemented technological devices designed to recognize
and delete copyrighted material, or does not monitor or provide an easy way
to detect copyrighted material on its Web site, there are no guarantees that
the infringing material will not be posted by another user at a later date.75
As a result, known infringement is perpetuated and the service provider is
hardly able to claim that it did not have actual knowledge of the
infringement.76
Because of the extensive media coverage, the inability or reluctance to
control new videos containing the same content from popping up after they
have been taken down,77 and the service providers’ own acknowledgment of
blatant copyright infringement, courts should infer that most of the service
providers have the requisite knowledge of infringement. At the very least,
they can conclude that service providers are “aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,” and, therefore,
ineligible for safe harbor protection.78
3. The “Financial Benefit” and the “Right and Ability to
Control” Requirements
If a court finds that the service provider lacks the requisite knowledge,
yet finds that it receives “a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and
ability to control such activity,”79 the service provider loses DMCA
75. In fact, as of Oct. 20, 2006, the SNL video, see infra note 150 and accompanying text, can
still be found on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_jcEsJz9rY. Although this
situation should diminish when YouTube rolls out its new technology, see Delaney & Smith, infra
note 182, at B1 and accompanying text, without such technology, this situation is bound to occur
repeatedly.
76. Furthermore, when multiple copyrights are claimed to have been infringed, §
512(c)(3)(A)(ii) states that notification of infringement only requires the copyright owner to
present a “a representative list” of the infringing material. Section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) requires that
the copyright owner only provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider
to locate the material.” Therefore, presumably, if the service provider fails to locate all files
containing the copyright owner’s material, the service provider can be held liable.
77. MySpace has announced that its new tool to combat copyright infringement does include a
mechanism that prevents other users from uploading the infringing video after it has been taken
down. See Yuki Noguchi, MySpace Sued Over Music Copyright Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2006, at D1. After several entertainment companies filed suit against YouTube, YouTube claimed
that it was also set to launch its own “video recognition technology” in September 2007. The
Associated Press, For YouTube, a System to Halt Copyright-Infringing Videos, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 2007, at C6.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(ii).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
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protection. Past courts have “embraced a very broad notion of ‘financial
benefit.’”80 When infringing activity serves as a “draw,” or “enhance[s] the
attractiveness of the venue,” courts have determined that the service
provider receives a direct financial benefit.81 Moreover, when a service
provider derives advertising revenue from the infringing activity or
material,82 or when “future revenue is directly dependent upon ‘increases in
userbase [sic],’”83 service providers have been found to have received a
direct financial benefit.84 Most video-sharing sites contain advertisements
on pages displaying copyrighted material.85 Therefore, since these videosharing sites gain in popularity primarily because of the infringing activity
that occurs, which consequently, increases advertising revenue,86 courts
should find direct financial benefit from the infringing activity.
Section 512(c)(1)(B) also mandates that the service provider have “the
right and ability to control such activity.”87 Although the DMCA does not
require service providers to monitor its service or Web sites in order to
locate and remove infringing material without receiving notice,88 and courts
have refused to penalize service providers who engage in voluntary, but
limited monitoring,89 YouTube and other providers can easily observe the
“infringing activity” occurring directly on its Web site.90 Given that other
sites do filter out infringing material,91 and since it is possible to develop

80. FRED VON LOHMAN, IAAL: WHAT PEER-TO-PEER DEVELOPERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
COPYRIGHT LAW 16 (2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p_copyright_wp_v5.pdf.
81. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263–64 (9th Cir. 1996); Perfect 10
v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 857 (C.D. Cal. 2006); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
82. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. at 857 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
83. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Grey’s Anatomy on YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
AejvULMQrJE (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
86. For example, YouTube divides videos into categories such as “Top Rated and “Most
Views.” See Recently Featured, http://www.youtube.com/browse?s=rf (last visited Nov. 26,
2006). A day after Kelly Ripa, co-host of ABC’s “Live with Regis and Kelly” blasted American
Idol’s Clay Aiken during the show, several clips of the discussion appeared on YouTube at the
direction of users. These videos were included in the YouTube’s “most views” section. When
viewing the video, advertisements appeared above the video. Therefore, every time the videos are
viewed on YouTube and shared with others who are directed to the YouTube page, the number of
users, and therefore, advertising revenue increases. Furthermore, the availability of the video
serves as a draw to the site. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmQPV4L8VdM (last visited
Nov. 22, 2006).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
89. See Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001). (“Congress
could not have intended for courts to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe
harbor provision of the DMCA because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the
DMCA.”).
90. See id. (distinguishing between infringing activities that occurred ‘offline’ from those that
occurred on the actual Web site).
91. See supra notes 5, 11 and accompanying text.
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tools to filter out infringing material,92 courts should conclude that
YouTube and other video-sharing sites have the “right and ability to control
such activity.”93 Furthermore, in relying upon the safe harbor provisions for
protection and ignoring obvious infringing activities occurring on the site,
they have, in effect, engaged in willful blindness.94 While the smaller Web
sites may not have the means necessary to implement technological devices
that can be used to locate and filter out infringing material, presumably
Google’s YouTube95 and News Corp.’s MySpace96 do have the financial
means and ability to implement such devices. As of November 2006, both
YouTube and MySpace were apparently testing out devices and MySpace
has unveiled an initiative to protect against infringement of audio content.97
However, several copyrighted videos have appeared, and continue to
appear, on both sites, and it remains to be seen whether these devices will
pacify copyright owners.
4. Conclusion
Since service providers need to satisfy all three prongs of § 512(c)(1) in
order to find refuge under the DMCA, YouTube and other video-sharing
sites should be precluded from finding safety under the DMCA because
they fail to satisfy at least one of the prongs included within the safe harbor
provision. Furthermore, because the DMCA codifies much of the common
law elements of direct,98 contributory,99 and vicarious liability,100 the safe
harbor offers little protection to service providers already found liable for
infringement. As one commentator stated, not only did “Congress
deliberately [leave] the law—with all of its ambiguities—unchanged,”101
but the “assurance of nonliability applies largely in situations where ISPs

92. See Ethan Smith, MySpace Deploys System to Guard Copyright Works, WALL ST. J., Oct.
31, 2006, at B2.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
94. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). (“Turning a
blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability.”).
95. See Holahan, supra note 12.
96. News Corporation acquired MySpace for $580 million. See Chris Gaither & Sallie
Hofmeister, News Corp. to Acquire MySpace; Seeking Web Ad Dollars, the Media Giant Agrees
to Buy the Parent of the Social-Networking Site, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A1.
97. See Smith, supra note 92. See also Press Release, CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic
Content
and
Advertising
Partnership
(Oct.
9,
2006),
available
at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=iXG7e1g-BWI. Finally, in May 2007,
MySpace announced the launch of its video-recognition tool. See Alex Woodson, MySpace
‘Down’ with Copyright Tool, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER.COM, May 14, 2007,
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003584525.
98. See discussion infra Part III.A.
99. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
100. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
101. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1837 (2000).
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face no liability in the first place.”102 Unless courts develop one standard for
indirect liability and another for DMCA protection, as another commentator
argues must be done,103 once the service provider is found liable for
copyright infringement, the DMCA will not provide any further protection
for that infringer. Therefore, unless Congress changes the law to adapt to
the latest trend in technological development, courts must look to the
common law elements of copyright liability to determine whether such sites
are liable for copyright infringement.
III. CASE LAW PRECEDENT: ARE VIDEO-SHARING WEB SITES
THE NEXT TO FALL?
If the service provider fails to find refuge under the DMCA’s safe
harbor provisions, this does not necessarily mean that it is automatically
liable for copyright infringement.104 Copyright owners have three claims
under which they may choose to find video-sharing sites liable: direct,
vicarious, and contributory liability. On the other hand, all defenses,
including copyright estoppel,105 fair use,106 and the “Sony-Betamax”
defense,107 are still available to the service provider.108
102. Id. at 1883 (stating that “risk aversion” is the reason why ISPs would even “undergo the
expense of complying with the DMCA’s statutory requirements” to protect against liability that
does not exist in the first place).
103. See Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for
Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV.
1005, 1007–08 (2000) (“[Arguing] that actual control must be read into 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1)(B) in
order to reconcile Title II [of the DMCA] with common law vicarious liability and to preserve the
structural integrity of Title II.”).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) (2006) (“The failure of a service provider’s conduct to qualify for
limitation of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a
defense by the service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title
or any other defense.”); see also CoStar Group v. Loopnet, 373 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“[A]n ISP is still entitled to all other arguments under the law—whether by way of an affirmative
defense or through an argument that conduct simply does not constitute a prima facie case of
infringement under the Copyright Act.”).
105. Copyright estoppel contains four elements:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct
shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must
rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.
Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
106. Fair use is an affirmative defense that is available to defendants that have been found liable
for infringement. The use of copyrighted material “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research,” is not copyright infringement. Courts determine fair
use depending upon the facts of each case, and consider four factors: (1) the purpose and character
of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), for the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Fair Use defense.
In March 2006, in an attempt to ease the tension between copyright liability and copyright
protection, YouTube implemented a ten-minute time limit for uploaded videos. See supra note 70
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A. DIRECT LIABILITY AND HOW IT PERTAINS TO VIDEO-SHARING
WEB SITES
The Copyright Act states that “[a]nyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner” is liable for copyright
infringement.109 To establish direct copyright infringement, the plaintiff
must prove that he or she is the owner of “a valid copyright” and that the
service provider has violated “one of the exclusive rights granted under
copyright.”110 Furthermore, “[t]here must be actual infringing conduct with
a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could
conclude that the [service provider] himself trespassed on the exclusive
domain of the copyright owner.”111 Most service providers and peer-to-peer
networks have not been held liable for direct infringement. This is because
they were not themselves uploading, “swapping,” or making copies of
material that was shared, and were acting merely as passive conduits,
facilitating infringement or transmitting infringing materials.112 Although
video-sharing sites only host the videos and may not actively participate in
posting the videos, copyrighted content is publicly displayed throughout the
sites.113 Undeniably, displaying videos containing both copyrighted and
non-copyrighted material for the purpose of viewing, commenting on, and
and accompanying text. The point of limiting the time for uploaded videos is arguably an attempt
to find refuge within the fair use defense. However, since entire episodes may be uploaded by one
individual user as long as each clip satisfies the 10-minute limit, YouTube’s actions are not likely
to ease any such tensions.
107. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)
(announcing that if the product is capable of “substantial noninfringing uses,” the owner of such
product may not be held contributorily liable). However, courts have declined to apply the Sony
“staple article of commerce doctrine,” to those who “exercise ongoing control over” their service.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“In Sony, the
defendant’s participation did not extend past manufacturing and selling the VCRs.”).
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(l).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). See supra note 17 and accompanying text, for a list of the exclusive
rights.
110. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (C.D. Cal 2006).
111. CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004). See also Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
112. See In re: Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding the peer-topeer network liable only for the indirect infringement due to the direct infringement of its users);
Costar, 373 F.3d at 550 (“If the Copyright Act does not hold the owner of the copying machine
liable as a direct infringer . . ., the ISP should not be found liable as a direct infringer when its
facility is used by a subscriber to violate a copyright without intervening conduct of the ISP.”);
Religious Tech. Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (“It would be especially inappropriate to hold liable
a service that acts more like a conduit, in other words, one that does not itself keep an archive of
files for more than a short duration.”).
113. For example, on Nov. 17, 2006, a search for ABC’s “Grey’s Anatomy” on YouTube.com
produced 2,195 results. Many were various clips from the television program, while others were
clips spliced together in music videos, which also contained copyrighted songs. See YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Grey%27s+Anatomy&search=Search (last visited
Nov. 17, 2006). Astonishingly, the same search conducted approximately one year later resulted in
almost 28,000 clips. See YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=
Grey%27s+Anatomy&search=Search (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).

2007]

To Sue or Not to Sue

181

distributing or sharing, is the Web sites’ purpose; and without the ability to
display the videos, the sites would be entirely worthless. The problem is
that publicly displaying copyrighted works is a violation of a copyright
owner’s exclusive right under § 106(5) of the Copyright Act.114
Although service providers need only violate one exclusive right to be
found liable for direct infringement, another exclusive right is also violated
when sites create indexes using thumbnail versions of the videos. Likewise,
in a case pending litigation, which involves a similar, but lesser-known
video-sharing site,115 the copyright owners have alleged that the site is
liable for direct infringement “because the Web site changed the formats of
the submitted videos.”116 In addition to changing the formats on MySpace,
YouTube, and various other sites when indexes are implemented, the
service providers also create categories for the videos, including “Top
Rated” and “Most Viewed,” and divide up the videos according to whether
they are considered entertainment, sports, comedy, etc.117 Several
copyrighted videos then appear within each of these categories.118 Courts
could easily determine that this is active participation or intervening
conduct on behalf of the service provider, and because of this, the sites do
not act merely as passive conduits.119 Accordingly, service providers may
be deemed to be reproducing the copyrighted work in a copy,120 violating
another exclusive right under § 106(1) of the Copyright Act.121
Consequently, as similar copyright owners have already demonstrated,122 as
114. The Copyright Act states that the copyright owner has the exclusive right “to display the
copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
115. Io Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. 5:06-CV-03926 (N.D. Cal. filed June 23, 2006).
See also Delaney, infra note 179.
116. Amanda Bronstad, Video Web Sites Download a Defense, NAT’L. L.J., Nov. 2, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1162375515690. See also Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828
(granting a preliminary injunction because the court found that Google’s creation and display of
thumbnail versions of Perfect 10’s photos would likely be determined a direct infringement).
117. See http://www.youtube.com/browse?s=rf for a list of the categories.
118. For example, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GC14VKUI4lg, for a clip of “The
Oprah Winfrey Show,” which is included in the “comedy” category. Oprah is owned by Harpo
Productions.
See
Terms
and
Conditions—Harpo,
http://www2.oprah.com/about/
aboutharpo/about_harpo_terms.jhtml#terms (last visited Nov. 25, 2006), for Harpo’s copyright
policy.
119. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
Web site that is only involved in storing and transmitting “data in the establishment and
maintenance of an Internet facility” and is “‘indifferent to the content’” it transmits, functions
more like a copy machine, and is therefore not directly liable for the infringing activity of its users
(quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003)).
120. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 828 (C.D. Cal 2006).
121. The Copyright Act states that the copyright owner has the exclusive right “to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
122. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(holding Web site operator directly liable for distributing and displaying copyrighted
photographs); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (holding a Web site directly liable for posting copyrighted photographs because the
Web site “did not function as a mere provider of access” to the Internet).
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long as the court does not determine that such uses are fair,123 proving that
the video-sharing Web sites are directly liable for copyright infringement is
not a difficult task.
B. INDIRECT LIABILITY AND HOW IT PERTAINS TO VIDEO-SHARING
WEB SITES
Indirect liability comes in two forms:124 contributory and vicarious
infringement. In 2005, the Supreme Court stated:
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement,
it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a
theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.125

Although YouTube and others may likely be held liable for their own
direct infringement, their users are also directly liable for the infringement
they cause by copying, uploading, and distributing copyrighted video to
other users or Web sites.126 Although copyright owners have sought user
information from service providers in the past,127 and in fact, YouTube
recently “promptly handed over” user information to Paramount Pictures,128
attacking the service providers and claiming indirect infringement is more
practicable and time- and cost-effective.129

123. See supra note 106, for a description of the fair use defense.
124. It may come in three forms, depending upon one’s interpretation of the Court’s use of the
“inducement theory.” See FRED VON LOHMANN, IAAL: WHAT PEER-TO-PEER DEVELOPERS
NEED
TO
KNOW
ABOUT
COPYRIGHT
LAW
4
n.
1
(Jan.
2006),
https://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p_copyright_wp_v5.pdf (explaining that until courts clarify whether
traditional contributory infringement has been replaced or whether it has just been supplemented,
service providers should “avoid any conduct that would give rise to liability under either” theory).
125. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005)
(holding a peer-to-peer network liable for infringement because it distributed the device “with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement”).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) & (3).
127. See Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that, under the DMCA provision 512(h), a subpoena to obtain user
information cannot be issued to a service provider acting merely as a passive conduit).
128. Ben Charny, YouTube Shared User Data with Studio Lawyers: Video Site Helped
Paramount Pictures Track Down and Sue Filmmaker, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/youtube-turned-over-userdata/story.aspx?guid=%7B52DAE3DD%2D70D2%2D4206%2D80A7%2DA809363944E9%7D.
129. See In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘[C]hasing
individual consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem.’”
(quoting Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002)); see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing
Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1376–78
(2004).
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1. Contributory Copyright Infringement
The traditional definition of contributory infringement provides that
when “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,” she is liable
for copyright infringement.130 In the most recent Supreme Court case
involving copyright infringement on a peer-to-peer network, however, the
Court stated that one is a contributory infringer when she “intentionally
induce[s] or encourage[s] direct infringement.”131 Therefore, before a court
will find a service provider liable for contributory infringement, there are
two elements that must be satisfied: (a) knowledge, which includes both
actual and constructive knowledge,132 and (b) acts of inducement of,
encouragement of, or a material contribution to, the direct infringement of
others. Since this note has already argued that YouTube and other videosharing services should be found to have the requisite knowledge of user
infringement,133 the only question remaining is whether the sites have
induced, encouraged or materially contributed to the direct infringement of
others.
In the Grokster opinion, in which the Court held a peer-to-peer network
liable for indirect infringement, the Court found that the network had
developed kits and advertisements specifically designed to attract Napster
users looking for an alternative after record companies filed suit against
Napster.134 The Court also found an “internal email from a company
executive” stating that once Napster shut down or started charging fees, he
wanted Grokster to be the place to which users would flock next.135 For
these reasons, the Court found that, regardless of whether the device was
capable of substantial non-infringing uses, because the network’s intent and
“principal object was use of their software to download copyrighted

130. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
131. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). In so
defining contributory liability, the Court cited Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162. Therefore,
whether the traditional definition has been replaced or just supplemented is an issue that will need
to be addressed by the Court in subsequent cases. For purposes of this note, I am combining the
two within a single analysis of contributory infringement. However, in its complaint against
YouTube, see Helft and Fabrikant, infra note 177 and accompanying text, Viacom chose to treat
inducement and contributory liability as distinct claims. See Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages at 21, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-02103
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). UMG did the same in its complaint against MySpace. See Complaint for Direct,
Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, for Inducement of Copyright Infringement,
and for Violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-07361 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
132. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
133. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
134. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 924–25.
135. Id.
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works,”136 the evidence presented was enough to conclude that the network
was liable for contributory or inducement liability.137
Video-sharing sites would contend that, by responding to infringement
notices and expeditiously removing infringing content, they are effectively
cooperating with copyright owners and actually discouraging infringement.
However, because Grokster had never developed tools to filter out
infringing material and also made money by selling advertising space to
accompany the infringing activity, these actions—or lack thereof—added
fuel to the Court’s conclusion that Grokster’s objectives were unlawful.138
Accordingly, in a case against YouTube or MySpace, these same or similar
arguments may be used against them to prove an unlawful intent.
Nevertheless, because YouTube and other service providers have satisfied
the DMCA requirements for taking down the infringing material once they
receive notice of infringement, courts may not find YouTube liable based
on the inducement theory.
Other courts, however, have given broad meaning to the term “material
contribution” and have found that if a service provider stores infringing
copies of works on a server, and provides access to those copies to other
users, it may indicate that the service provider materially contributed to the
infringement.139 Therefore, if courts analyze contributory liability based on
traditional notions, instead of focusing on the Grokster theory, YouTube
and other sites may be prime targets for contributory liability.
2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
A service provider may also be held liable for vicarious infringement
when there is direct profit from the infringement and the service provider
“has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, even if the [service
provider] initially lacks knowledge of the infringement.”140 These elements
have been codified by the DMCA,141 and therefore, for purposes of this
argument, since the analysis is nearly identical, it is not necessary to
analyze vicarious liability further.
3. Conclusion
Copyright holders have enough evidence to support allegations of direct
or indirect copyright infringement against most video-sharing sites; and
136. Id. at 926.
137. Id. at 941. The court emphasized the network’s “purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct” in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 937.
138. Id. at 939–40.
139. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078 (finding that a service provider materially contributed to
infringement when it stored infringing copies of the copyright owner’s work on a server and then
provided user access to the copies).
140. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9.
141. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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contrary to what most commentators have been saying,142 the DMCA
provides only a thin veil of protection. Threatening such sites with suit in
order to apply pressure on them to cooperate further with copyright owners
is essential to maintaining control over content. Furthermore, it is crucial
for obtaining the benefit of copyright protection.143 Likewise, suing smaller
sites that are engaging in rampant copyright infringement, in order to
establish precedent, is also essential and necessary to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.”144 Arguably, however, forcing sites like
YouTube or MySpace to shut down or become a fee-based service à la
Napster—a service that has been struggling to stay afloat145—will only
anger consumers, decrease viewership, and stifle digital innovation.
Consequently, although the entertainment industry’s response to the new
digital phenomenon may be frenzied and “shockingly slow,”146 there are
indications that the industry is finally catching on. And this time, it may not
be too late.147
IV. FRIEND OR FOE: THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY’S
SCHIZOPHRENIC RESPONSE TO THE DIGITAL
PHENOMENON
A. THE FRENZIED NETWORK RESPONSES
Over the latter part of 2006, the entertainment industry’s reaction to the
recent explosion and popularity of video-sharing sites has been increasingly
frenzied.148 As this section demonstrates, there have been some positive
reactions, yet most indicate that the industry is both ambivalent and
inconsistent in its decision-making pertaining to whether to take action

142. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 19 (“[YouTube’s] ‘beg for forgiveness’ approach—taking
copyrighted content off its site only when faced with a complaint—probably places them
comfortably within the safe harbor provisions of 1998’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”).
143. Arguably, without the threat of suit or the ability to hold the sites responsible for blatant
and on-going copyright infringement, there will be no incentive for the sites to make deals and
share revenue. Furthermore, without a finding of liability, content owners will likely no longer be
able to maintain control over their content in the digital realm. While users may find excitement in
this outcome, the incentive to creators, which is provided by copyright law, would essentially be
destroyed. Presumably, this is an outcome most copyright owners would clearly like to avoid.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
145. See Geist, supra note 19, at C3.
146. McKenna, supra note 2.
147. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
148. Compare, e.g., Steve Johnson, YouTube’s Dream Could Get Clipped, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22,
2006, at C1 (“When you take into account . . . Comedy Central’s wink-and-a-nod at the
proliferation of ‘Daily Show’ and ‘Colbert Report’ clips that users upload, . . . copyright holders
seem to be deciding that the promotional value of YouTube . . . is valuable.”), with Noam Cohen,
YouTube is Purging Copyrighted Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C8 (“The site late last week
began purging copyrighted material from Comedy Central, including clips from YouTube
stalwarts like ‘The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,’ ‘The Colbert Report’ and ‘South Park’ . . .
[which] was a ‘result of third-party notification by Comedy Central.’”).
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against, or to work with, such sites. Some entertainment conglomerates
perceive the sites’ blatant and severe copyright infringement as a beneficial
promotional tool, embracing and/or partnering up with the sites, while
others argue that the service providers are reaping benefits they do not
deserve to reap.149
In February 2006, after NBC discovered that a user uploaded its now
infamous Saturday Night Live skit entitled “Chronicles of Narnia,”150 onto
YouTube’s site, which users then viewed approximately five million times,
the network sent YouTube a notice, allegedly asking the site to “remove
about 500 clips of NBC material from its site or face legal action.”151 NBC
waited until after the video had hit its “peak download period” before
asking that the video be taken off the site,152 evidently recognizing the
promotional value in allowing the clip to be seen by millions of viewers.
Consequently, while NBC continues to monitor YouTube’s site in search of
user-uploaded copyrighted videos,153 in June 2006, the network decided to
partner up with YouTube.154 Six months later, NBC posted a different
Saturday Night Live skit after presumably realizing that, by allowing
viewers to watch a skit from a program that had seemingly lost its spark,
new interest in the program could be generated and, consequently, a new
spark ignited.155 However, it remains to be seen how long this partnership
will last since NBC Universal recently created National Broadband
Company (NBBC), which will distribute programming to internet sites
149. Compare, e.g., Greg Johnson & Lance Pugmire, NHL, YouTube Reach Video Agreement,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at D3 (“The NHL clearly understands the value of the community
factor on YouTube. This is designed to help … connect with their fans.”) (internal quotation
omitted), with Ken Fisher, YouTube and the Copyright Cops: Safe… for now?, ARSTECHNICA,
July 16, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060716-7273.html (“[W]hy does the BBC
get hit with letters, licensing demands, and potential lawsuits when they use unauthorized
material, yet YouTube is packed to the gills with it?”).
150. The skit features Andy Samberg and Chris Parnell rapping and is now available for free
viewing at NBC 24/7 Video, http://www.nbc.com/Video/videos/snl_1432_narnia.shtml (last
visited Sept. 21, 2006) and can also be downloaded from Apple iTunes. See Live, from iTunes, it’s
‘Saturday Night’, CNNMONEY, Jan. 10, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/10/technology/
apple_snl/index.htm.
151. John Biggs, Media Talk; A Video Clip Goes Viral, and a TV Network Wants to Control It,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at C5. “Chronicles of Narnia” is also known as “Lazy Sunday.”
152. Peter Pollack, NBC Orders Removal of Video from Download Site, ARSTECHNICA, Feb.
17, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060217-6213.html.
153. See Stone, supra note 19 (describing how NBC would probably have to ask YouTube to
again remove the SNL clip from the site when a user uploaded the video after YouTube had
removed it).
154. See Press Release, YouTube, NBC and YouTube Announce Strategic Partnership (June 27,
2006), available at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=c0g5-NsDdJQ (“[A] . . .
partnership . . . will combine NBC’s . . . programming with YouTube’s vast audience . . . to
promote NBC’s Fall program lineup and other preferred shows over the next year.”).
155. See Pete Cashmore, YouTube Gives NBC a Hit in a Box, MASHABLE!, Dec. 19, 2006,
http://mashable.com/2006/12/19/youtube-gives-nbc-a-hit-in-a-box/ (“Not only have the SNL clips
dominated YouTube’s Most Viewed and Top Rated clips this week, but they’ve also been the
most linked-to videos . . . .”).
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“including CNET, Forbes, and the About.com unit of The New York Times
Company.”156
Like NBC, CBS has also demonstrated its apparent uncertainty
pertaining to the video-sharing site’s value. Early in 2006, CBS asked
YouTube to remove a video of an autistic teen who, in four minutes, scored
twenty points during his high school basketball team’s last game of the
year.157 This video, which appeared on CBSNews.com, was also uploaded
onto YouTube, and CBS soon realized that bloggers were directing more
viewers to the video on YouTube than to its actual source. As a result, the
video soon “became the most viewed video of the week” on YouTube.158
Eventually, CBS also learned its lesson, and in October 2006, the network
and YouTube struck a deal.159 Consequently, a month later, YouTube
announced that CBS’s content was among the “most viewed videos on
YouTube,” much to the delight of YouTube and CBS executives.160
ABC, however, has chosen a different route. Upon learning that a racy
scene from an unaired clip of ABC’s hit show “Desperate Housewives” had
found its way onto YouTube without permission, ABC demanded that
YouTube remove the clip.161 Consequently, although ABC recognized the
site’s value in terms of attracting viewers, instead of partnering up with
YouTube, the network dedicated its resources to creating its own site upon
which viewers can watch recently aired episodes of some of the most
popular ABC programs.162 Although this is certainly a viable option, ABC
may have disregarded YouTube’s value a little too quickly.163
156. Saul Hansell, NBC and Its Stations Venture Into Online Video Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2006, at C2. Interestingly, over a year later, “NBC pulled its channel off of YouTube” in
anticipation of the launch of a new online video service called Hulu, which is set to offer
approximately “90 TV shows” and “10 feature films” from NBC, Sony, MGM, and News Corp.
Kenneth Li, Hulu adds Sony, MGM, launches test, REUTERS, Oct. 29, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/email/idUSN2854415820071029.
157. See Brian Montopoli, The Jason McElwain Story Comes to CBS News—And YouTube,
CBS
NEWS,
Feb.
27,
2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/02/27/publiceye/
entry1350516.shtml.
158. Id. (“CBS News, after all, would love to see that million people head to its site, not least
because increased traffic means increased advertising revenue.”).
159. See Press Release, YouTube, CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic Content and Advertising
Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), available at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?
entry=iXG7e1g-BWI.
160. Press Release, YouTube, After One Month, CBS Content Among Most Viewed Videos on
YouTube
(Nov.
21,
2006),
available
at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=oJpEXVevcKg (“‘Above all the other good
news, what’s most exciting here is the extent to which CBS is learning about its audience as never
before,’ said Quincy Smith, President, CBS Interactive.”).
161. See Mike Shields, YouTube Streams Desperate Sex Scene, MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 4, 2006,
http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003086573.
162. See Nate Anderson, Disney-ABC: “We understand piracy now as a business model”,
ARSTECHNICA, Oct. 10, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061010-7946.html (“[T]he
goal becomes offering a more compelling product than file-swapping networks can provide, rather
that [sic] attempting (for instance) to sue the users who like your content.”).
163. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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Finally, Comedy Central sent YouTube a notice to remove “Colbert
Report” and “The Daily Show with John Stewart” clips, after months of
Comedy Central’s seemingly implicit consent to the widespread
dissemination of such clips via YouTube and other video-sharing sites.164 A
week later, however, the clips found their way back onto the site, which
made commentators suspect that a potential deal was on the horizon
between Viacom—under whose corporate umbrella Comedy Central
exists—and YouTube.165 Besides Viacom’s subsequent filing of a lawsuit,
however, which is discussed in the next section, the networks have yet to
take further action against YouTube. This is arguably due to their
uncertainty pertaining to whether YouTube’s promotional value exceeds the
networks’ potential revenue loss, or from their reluctance to take action
until the law is more firmly developed.
B. INTRODUCING: THE LAWSUITS
For the majority of 2006, YouTube had been running smoothly,
allowing users to upload copyrighted video, while maintaining that the
DMCA “safe harbor” protected the site from liability.166 On July 14, 2006,
however, YouTube received its first blow when Robert Tur filed suit in the
United States District Court, Central District of California.167 Tur, owner
and operator of Los Angeles News Service and copyright owner of the
famous Reginald Denny beating video and several others, 168 claimed that
he was entitled to “$150,000 for each work infringed upon and a court order
enjoining YouTube from allowing his work [to] be posted on the Web
site.”169 While YouTube believes Tur’s claim is “without merit,” given the

164. See YouTube Takes Down Comedy Central Clips Based on DMCA Claims, NEWSCLOUD,
Oct. 27, 2006, http://www.newscloud.com/read/75528, for an example of the notice that YouTube
sends to users who upload allegedly infringing material after it receives a takedown notice from
the copyright owner, which is a requirement of the DMCA.
165. See Nate Anderson, Comedy Central Clips Back on YouTube, ARSTECHNICA, Nov. 1,
2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061101-8126.html.
166. See Simmons, supra note 47.
167. See Bryant, supra note 54. As of August 2007, Tur’s lawsuit is being dropped and
combined in a potential class action suit against YouTube, which is pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. See YouTube Class Action,
http://www.youtubeclassaction.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2007). The growing list of plaintiffs
include the National Music Publisher’s Association, The Football Association Premier League,
and independent music publisher, Bourne Co. See Ethan Smith & Kevin J. Delaney, Music
Publishers Join YouTube Copyright Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at A2.
168. During the 1992 L.A. riots, Reginald Denny, a white man, was pulled out of his truck and
almost beaten to death by black rioters after the police officers who attacked Rodney King were
acquitted. See Timothy Egan, AFTER THE RIOTS; Scorned, Los Angeles Police Find Less Pride
in the Badge, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at A1. Tur also filmed the O.J. Simpson’s slow-speed
police chase in 1994. See Simmons, supra note 47.
169. Simmons, supra note 47. See also Bryant, supra note 54, for an analysis of Tur’s claims, a
response from Robert Tur, and a copy of Tur’s original complaint.
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recent decisions that have gone against similar types of services, the court
may not agree.170
In addition to Tur’s lawsuit, Universal Music Group’s Chief Executive
received much attention after he threatened suit against both MySpace and
YouTube, allegedly stating that the sites owe Universal “tens of millions of
dollars” for allowing copyrighted material to appear on the site.171
However, soon after these remarks were made, Universal decided to partner
up with YouTube,172 and about a week later, filed suit against Bolt.com173
and Grouper.com,174 two smaller, lesser-known video-sharing sites.175
Thereafter, the threats against MySpace became a reality when, on
November 17, 2006, Universal filed suit against the social-networking
site.176
170. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In Re:
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
171. Charles Duhigg, California and the West; Music Chief Rails at Websites; Head of
Universal Says Social Spots Such as YouTube and MySpace help Violate Copyrights, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2006, at C2 (internal quotation omitted).
172. See Sorkin & Peters, infra note 184.
173. Bolt.com has since been bought by GoFish.com. Joshua Chaffin, Rights Success for
Universal as Bolt Settles, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8575f190-cdcd11db-839d-000b5df10621.html. In March 2007, a settlement agreement allegedly required Bolt to
pay Universal a “multimillion-dollar share of the proceeds of Bolt’s recent sale to . . . GoFish, as
damages for past copyright infringement.” Id.
174. In August 2006, Sony Pictures Entertainment purchased Grouper for $65 million. Jim
Benson, Grouper Drops User-Generated Video; Rebranded Sony company to become streaming
Web network, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 16, 2007, at 3. A year later, the site dropped its
user-generated
content
and
relaunched
as
Crackle.com.
Crackle,
http://crackle.com/play/Flash8.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
175. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Universal Sues Video Sharing Websites; The record label’s
move against Grouper and Bolt opens a new front in copyright litigation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2006, at C1. These suits could set the precedent regarding whether such sites are, in fact, protected
under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision. See Patrick Goldstein, The People’s Republic of
YouTube, L.A. TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/cl-etgoldstein17oct17,0,171750,print.story?coll=la-home-entertainment. Interestingly, a few days after
Google acquired YouTube, see La Monica, supra note 12, and a few days before Universal filed
suit,
Mark
Cuban,
see
Mark
Cuban
Biography,
http://www.nba.com/mavericks/news/cuban_bio000329.html, predicted that the big entertainment
companies would implement this exact strategy, see Mark Cuban, I Was Wrong, BLOG
MAVERICK,
THE
MARK
CUBAN
WEBLOG,
Oct.
11,
2006,
http://www.blogmaverick.com/2006/10/11/i-was-wrong/ (“Rather than suing Gootube, the media
companies will first sue several of the imitators and competitors that have no money whatsoever.
They wont [sic] sue those companies to get money, they will sue a bunch of those companies to
build precedent.”). Cuban is also considering buying Tur’s Los Angeles News Service. See Greg
Sandoval, Mark Cuban Courts YouTube Foe, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/cnet/CNET_2100-1030_36135703.html?ex=1164258000&en=1e0ba4d988c315cc&ei=5070&emc=etal.
176. See, e.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski, MySpace is Sued by Universal Music; The Record Label
Accuses the Social Networking Site of Widespread Piracy of Songs and Videos. The News Corp.
Unit Calls the Lawsuit Unnecessary, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at C1 (“[L]awyers say Universal
has no choice: It can’t afford to have some sites distributing for free videos that others pay to
license. But the issue also complicates business for Universal executives who have sought to
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Finally, after several months of negotiations failed and after much
media speculation about an impending deal, in early 2007 Viacom filed suit
against YouTube for copyright violations. 177 In this suit, Viacom is
“seeking more than $1 billion in damages and an injunction prohibiting
Google and YouTube from committing further infringement.”178
Unfortunately, if these video-sharing sites continue to allow
copyrighted work to appear without taking further action to prevent such
proliferation, these claims are bound to continue until the video sharing
sites develop more intelligent business plans.179 Fortunately, however, there
are other options that could prove to be mutually beneficial, and both the
sites and some industry giants are finally figuring this out.
C. ISSUES IN THE INTERIM
Aside from the network deals, many entertainment conglomerates have
chosen to take advantage of YouTube’s popularity, while others have
engaged various file sharing sites to display and/or distribute their videos.180
In September, Warner Music Group (WMG), for example, negotiated a
partnership deal with YouTube, making WMG “the first music company to
harness YouTube’s leading video entertainment service to commercially
distribute its music video catalog.”181 However, this partnership was formed
after YouTube developed plans to “[roll] out technology designed to
automatically spot copyrighted material that users upload without the
permission of media companies.”182 This system “is an ambitious effort to
embrace social networking as a marketing tool.”); Jeff Leeds, Universal Music Sues MySpace for
Copyright Infringement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at C3. Interestingly, this move comes after
MySpace implemented a system to identify and filter out copyrighted material. See Smith, supra
note 92 (“This system is supposed to filter out unauthorized content and identify licensed content
in order to compensate copyright owners for its use. MySpace is initially testing its service only
on Universal content.”).
177. Miguel Helft and Geraldine Fabrikant, Viacom Sues Google Over Video Clips on Its
Sharing Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C1.
178. Id.
179. In fact, in June, 2006 “[a]dult entertainment company Io Group Inc. . . . filed a lawsuit
against Veoh Networks Inc., an online video-sharing service, in a potential important legal test of
Web video companies’ liability for copyright infringement claims.” Kevin Delaney, Veoh Faces
Copyright Suit, a test of Web Video, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 29, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115154757274993889.html.
180. See Andrew Wallenstein, Biz Not Sure How to Treat Upstart YouTube, THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/
article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002199881 (“News Corp. isn’t the only media giant that
recognizes the advertising potential of viral video. Not long after the acquisition of MySpace.com,
Viacom grabbed a similar site, iFilm.com. Last week, NBC Universal acquired the femaletargeted Web site iVillage, which it plans to seed with video programming as well.”).
181. See Press Release, YouTube, Warner Music Group and YouTube Announce Landmark
Video Distribution and Revenue Partnership (Sept. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=vCfgHo5_Fb4 (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
182. Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTube Model Is Compromise Over Copyrights, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at B1.
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give media companies more control over the video on the site and to
address their fears that others will profit from consumers’ piracy of their
content.”183 WMG may have been the first to embrace this new technology;
however, others are slowly beginning to follow suit.184
While YouTube is, ostensibly, more than willing to work with industry
giants in order to develop solutions that might combat copyright
infringement for the major corporations while simultaneously and
strategically benefiting economically, these solutions do not remedy the
entire problem. The development of filtering tools may, in the short-term,
quiet some of the industry giants. However, Robert Tur and other smaller
companies and creators, who make their living off of licensing and royalty
payments, will not be able to participate.185 This means that they will still
have the extremely arduous and tedious task of policing the site and
complying with the “notice” provisions under the DMCA186 to make sure
their work is not uploaded, viewed, and then shared with several millions of
Internet users without permission or payment. Unless the sites are willing to
take a firmer stance against the proliferation of copyright infringement,
these tools will only solve part of the problem. Because the digital age has
spawned developments in all areas, chances are, technologically savvy
users will find ways to circumvent YouTube’s new technology
(notwithstanding the fact that this is, of course, illegal)187 and find new,
perhaps lesser-known, sites on which to post copyrighted material.188
The recent lawsuits filed by Universal, Viacom, and the pending class
action,189 as well as the rest of the industry’s conflicting responses upon
finding its copyrighted content spread throughout the Internet, demonstrate
183. Id.
184. As of Oct. 9, “YouTube reached agreements with the Universal Music Group and Sony
BMG Music Entertainment. . . .” Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeremy W. Peters, Google to Acquire
TIMES
ONLINE,
Oct.
9,
2006,
YouTube
for
$1.65
Billion,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/business/09cnd-deal.html?ref=business. Universal, Sony and
Warner Music could receive approximately $50 million from the deals. See Andrew Ross Sorkin
& Jeff Leeds, Music Companies Grab a Share of the YouTube Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at
C1. As of Nov. 15, the NHL reached an agreement with YouTube, making it the first agreement to
be made between the site and the major sports leagues. See Johnson & Pugmire, supra note 149.
However, other sports entities are not as willing to work with YouTube and are contemplating
suit. See Rhys Blakely, German Football Latest to Threaten YouTube, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 3,
2006, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9071-2436255,00.html.
185. See Delaney & Smith, supra note 182, at B1 (quoting YouTube’s Chief Executive and
stating that YouTube is only “‘building tools for record labels, TV networks and movie studios’”).
186. 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3) (2006).
187. See DMCA § 103, 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
188. “The end of Napster didn’t mean the end of file sharing. The end of Grokster didn’t mean
the end of file sharing. New technologies such as BitTorrent and sites like ThePirateBay.org have
sidestepped around any new controls, and others will move to take their place once
countermeasures are found for these.” Sean Carton, YouTube: Another Casualty in the Copyright
Wars?, EXTREME DRM, July 24, 2006, http://www.extremedrm.com/article/YouTube+
Another+Casuality+in+the+Copyright+Wars/184179_1.aspx.
189. See supra notes 167, 171, 175, 177 and accompanying text.

192

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

the industry’s lack of certainty and fruitless attempt to figure out what the
law actually means and what kind of protection it actually provides.
Therefore, we will undoubtedly continue to see these video-sharing Web
sites going by way of the peer-to-peer networks unless they figure out how
to play ball with the corporate giants.190 Ultimately however, service
providers and entertainment conglomerates need to realize that they must
work together with, not against, one another if they want to continue to
exist and prosper in the digital realm.
V. ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, MEET CONSUMER DEMAND
A. THE BOTTOM LINE
Peer-to-peer networks such as Napster, Grokster, and Aimster were
innovative ideas that failed primarily because the providers instituted faulty
business models. They also failed because they built systems that were
designed to induce or encourage users to infringe upon copyright owners’
valid and exclusive rights while refusing to cooperate with the corporate
entities that controlled their fate. Regardless of what small businesses or
independent creators may think of the entertainment giants, they cannot
build successful business models that are designed to break copyright law, a
law that has enjoyed tremendous support for over 200 years.191 As history
indicates, companies that derive revenue or gain in popularity by selling a
product that is not theirs to sell will fall prey to those with the power to
control and/or destroy them. As long as copyrighted material continues to
appear on the sites, unless video-sharing Web sites succumb to industry
pressure and combine forces with the corporate powers against whom they
had previously fought, these sites will likely become the next Napster,
Grokster, or Aimster.
The entertainment industry, moreover, must also learn from past
mistakes. As one commentator has already pointed out, once the major
entertainment companies successfully shut down Napster, entities other
than the record companies ended up reaping the benefits.192 While the
record companies won the legal battle, they lost the opportunity to profit
substantially from the achievement. Therefore, instead of shutting down the
sites, the entertainment industry must recognize that “[c]ompanies such as
190. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In Re:
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
191. See discussion supra Part II.A.
192. “[Major media companies] battled Napster and other file sharing services into submission.
. . . [and] left the door wide open for the Apple iPod and iTunes service to dominate the legitimate
market. It’s a business that should have belonged to the music industry, not Apple. . . . It’s as if
providing music and videos to consumers is an afterthought for these guys. They don’t seem to
really care how consumers buy their music, so long as they don’t steal it. Talk about a failed
business model.” McKenna, supra note 2.
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YouTube, MySpace and others have created entirely new markets where the
major content providers apparently saw no value;”193 and the digital age has
spawned technological developments and innovation over which the
industry can no longer maintain complete control. Even if the industry
figures out how to create Web sites using technology comparable to the
video-sharing sites,194 the ease and convenience of one-stop shopping is
presumably more appealing than having to search each individual site for
content.195 For example, although ABC’s actions196 may prove to be a
qualified success for the network, there are a few reasons why it would
presumably be even more lucrative to partner up with sites such as
YouTube.
First, the ABC favorites will inevitably appear on YouTube regardless
of whether ABC or a user uploads the clips unless and until YouTube
implements video-recognition technology. If ABC is already allowing users
to view entire episodes, and YouTube implements tools to recognize
copyrighted content, the network can then reap the monetary rewards every
time a user views an ABC clip. Next, if users view clips that capture their
interest, the ten minute time-limit that YouTube imposes on certain videos
may leave them thirsty for more. Therefore, the higher quality video that
ABC can provide may encourage users to visit ABC’s site to view the entire
episode. ABC then profits from displaying their videos on YouTube as well
as their own Web site and increases their viewership and popularity among
video-sharing Web site users.197
193. McKenna, supra note 2. “‘If we had licensed Napster we could have saved ourselves
billions and got a real head start in digital music,’” one music executive said. ‘But as usual the
lawyers had the loudest voices.’” Dominic Rushe & Paul Durman, Google helps media giants see
ONLINE,
Oct.
15,
2006,
things
YouTube’s
way,
U.K.
TIMES
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,20411-2404038.html.
194. “Even today, the media conglomerates are doing a pitiful job of getting their content into
the hands of consumers. Universal Music’s website, . . ., is slow and clunky.” Mckenna, supra
note 2.
195. While writing this note, media giants including NBC Universal, News Corp., Viacom and
possibly CBS, were preparing to announce that they were trying to put together a “new Web site
that will feature some of their best-known television programming and other clips in an attempt to
build a business for distributing video on the Internet to rival YouTube.” Richard Siklos & Bill
Carter, Old Model Versus A Speedster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at C1. Commentators
immediately began expressing doubts about whether the networks would get along well enough to
make it work, and also about its effectiveness. See id.; see also Pete Cashmore, “Anti-YouTube”
May Be Announced Next Week: Really Bad Idea, MASHABLE!, Dec. 17, 2006,
http://mashable.com/2006/12/17/anti-youtube/ (“YouTube is the media darling right now—the
little startup whose founders took on the big guys and won. . . . [B]uilding a whole new site seems
about as likely to succeed as trying to build your own iTunes clone.”). By March 2007, News
Corp. and NBC announced they had concluded a deal “to showcase their own programming across
the Internet’s biggest Web sites, as well as a new jointly owned Web destination.” See Richard
Siklos, News Corp. and NBC in Web Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at C1.
196. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
197. One commentator adds that “you can’t expect YouTube users to be driven to your content
if you’re not promoting it in any way. It seems likely that while the number of viewers to CBS
shows has risen, those US networks that don’t promote their content have seen no difference.”
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As the law continues to adapt to new developments, those who wish to
exercise control over their work must also adapt. Once a precedent is set
and copyright owners prove one more time that working within the law is
the better and more profitable idea,198 those who are finding these new
markets need to join forces with the entertainment industry, and the
entertainment giants must refrain from blindly shutting these innovators
down.
Finally, copyright laws were developed to inspire and compensate
artists for their creations. Video-sharing sites that respond to these desires,
such as Revver,199 which pays users who upload and share videos each time
another user clicks on an advertisement accompanying the video and
monitors all videos uploaded, have responded to copyright law’s purpose
and should be commended.200 However, even when a service provider
claims that every video is inspected to prevent a user from uploading
copyrighted content, there are bound to be those that slip through the
cracks. Therefore, in order to survive, service providers must show
copyright owners that they are eager and prepared to do everything in their
power to combat the copyright infringement that occurs on their Web sites.
B. THE SOLUTION
To ease the tension among copyright owners’ concerns, user desires,
and digital innovation, as well as to avoid potential lawsuits, there needs to
be a compromise. Presumably, service providers cannot control every one
of their subscribers’ actions. They can, however, show copyright owners
that they are taking all practicable steps to prevent against copyright
infringement occurring on their sites. To do so, there are a few simple steps
that should be followed. First, home pages of every video-sharing Web site
should indicate in bold letters that the forum must not be used for uploading
and displaying copyrighted video. Because the average consumer may not
know exactly what copyright infringement laws entail, the service provider
should provide some examples of infringing activity. If the service provider
does not want this material listed directly on the home page, the provider
should explicitly and boldly direct users to a page containing copyright
information. Second, once subscribers sign up and an e-mail is sent to his or
her address to confirm registration, the e-mail should clearly state the
service provider’s policy against copyright infringement and repeat
Pete
Cashmore,
YouTube
vs[.]
TV,
MASHABLE!,
Nov.
27,
2006,
http://mashable.com/2006/11/27/youtube-vs-tv/ (noting that YouTube may be stealing viewers
away from television, at least in the U.K). ABC News, however, does have a deal with Yahoo!
News. See Yahoo, ABC News Extend Pact, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 13, 2006,
http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003520964.
198. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
199. See Revver, supra note 5.
200. See What is Revver?, http://one.revver.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); Copyright
Information, http://one.revver.com/go/copyright/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
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infringers. Third, before a subscriber may upload his or her video on to the
site, there should be a tool for verifying ownership that also informs
subscribers of the consequences of their misrepresentation. Fourth, the
service provider must implement tools to identify and protect against
infringing material—whether by monitoring the site or through
technological devices.
Although these tools may not be able to identify every unauthorized
copyrighted video or song, it would at least ease most copyright owners’
concerns. If the copyright owners later discovered their video displayed on
the site, they can then initiate the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown
procedures.201 At that point, if a user should attempt to upload the video
again, the filtering tool should identify the video, and prevent it from being
uploaded again. Without these actions or tools, the incentive for copyright
owners to cooperate with the video-sharing sites is compromised.
Finally, depending upon how much control the copyright owner wants
to exert over the distributed content, each copyright owner can craft a deal
that makes sense for them and meets their individualized needs. As
evidenced by the CBS-YouTube deal,202 the Universal-YouTube deal,203
and the WMG-YouTube deal,204 there are ways to satisfy consumers, videosharing sites, and the entertainment conglomerates without resorting to a
legal battle. Through partnership, cooperation, and good faith efforts, the
Robert Turs, the Universals, the music publishers, the video-sharing Web
sites, and the consumers may all enjoy this piece of the digital pie.
Andrea Frey*
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See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
See Press Release, supra note 97.
See Sorkin & Peters, supra note 184.
See Press Release, supra note 181.
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